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Abstract: This thesis analyzes Ecuadorian development through a historical perspective, in 
which the changes related to institutions and beliefs are crucial for the explanation of their 
dramatic transformation. In this respect, during most of its history Ecuador was characterized 
for lack of leadership, high external dependence, corruption, selfish interests of groups of 
power, and huge instability. Indeed, their weak institutions were considered the major cause of 
its backwardness, since certain beliefs and customs hindered the incentives for institutional 
change. However, since 2007 Ecuador broke away from its past. That is, this country entered 
into a new development path towards a more open society in economic and political terms. 
The 'analytic narratives' methodology found support for institutional change process based on 
the emergence of a window of opportunity, the strong presence of a leader and the consequent 
establishment of a solid constitutional process. As a consequence, some indicators 
demonstrate the significance of these changes, such as: increases in economic growth rate and 
social spending and decreases in unemployment, poverty and inequality. Lastly, the evolution 
of certain customs and beliefs in favor of social welfare and national progress largely support 
the beginning of a new trajectory towards a more open society. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a lot of literature explaining the major cause of differences in economic 
development between developed and developing regions. In this respect, the most 
widespread reason argues that 'institutions' are important for economic development and 
growth (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2002; Aron, 2000; Acemoglu, et al, 2001; Rodrik 2004). 
But, it is necessary to consider that development is contextual, i.e. that economic and 
political results will depend on the specific time and space regarding different institutional 
arrangements that shape different development paths. 
In this vein, there are some countries that broke away with its past through big changes in 
its development trajectories. It implies the transition towards a more open society in order 
to achieve better outcomes. Thus (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009) argued that open 
access societies are more likely to promote economic growth, sustained political 
development and social stability. 
Within this context, since 2007 Ecuador has changed its path towards a more open society 
in economic and political terms. So, it is fundamental to analyze the economic history of 
Ecuador to better understand the way this country has entered into a process of changes, 
concerning beliefs and institutions, which have determined its transformation.  
In order to achieve the long-awaited development, Ecuadorian governments have used 
different strategies including developmental models, planning programs, etc. Unfortunately, 
during most of its history, the lack of leadership, high external dependence, selfish interests 
of elites, huge instability besides certain customs and beliefs hindered the incentives for 
institutional change.  
The 1970s was characterized by several dictatorships and a slight economic improvement 
due to high international oil prices, stressing that oil became the first item of national 
income (Acosta, 2012). But political unrest was prevailing in those years, since the military 
abused of their power against national interests. During the 80s, democracy was restored 
for the wrong reasons, because certain groups did not want to lose their power, and they 
chose ‘democracy’ as a rapid solution to their problems. In 1999, a major financial crisis 
destabilized the country that adopted the 'dollarization' to solve the severe effects of the 
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crisis. After that event, Ecuador had quite unstable democracies that caused a crisis of 
political representation. 
In 2006 Rafael Correa took advantage of that circumstance to establish his beliefs and 
change society in a positive way. This fact was almost impossible considering the unstable 
past of the country. The poor social beliefs constituted the main constraint of national 
progress. So, Ecuador during this period (2007-2014) has shown strong evidence of the 
start of a new era. Some indicators demonstrated the significance of these changes, such as: 
economic growth rate and social spending with an upward trend; and unemployment, 
poverty and inequality with a downtrend.  
Correa's leadership is crucial to comprehend the change of the country's trajectory towards 
a more open society. While it is true, that the outcomes reflect dramatic progress regarding 
distributional equality and equity; the beliefs and institutions has evolved remarkably in 
Ecuador. In this context, to better understand the break away with the past, this study will 
focus on the last 64 years (1950 - 2014).  Thereby, this Master thesis will investigate the 
changes in beliefs and institutions over time. 
Besides, the motivation arose from the personal interest in the contribution of this kind of 
studies for Ecuador. This country has quite few studies that explain their transformation 
since 2007. So, it is necessary to provide a significant academic tool regarding institutions 
and development in Ecuador. The main objective of this study is to analyze the 
fundamental changes related to key features of open societies.  
In this respect, this thesis wants to test the following hypothesis: 
 The constitutional process is the main trigger of institutional change in Ecuador 
because it has transformed the economic and fiscal policies to achieve a more open 
society. 
In order to find support for the given hypothesis, this study will rely on circumstantial 
evidence
1
 that will be provided by the analytical narratives. As (Alston et al., 2013) pointed 
out some areas like economic history must rely on circumstantial evidence, which shows 
                                                            
1 Alston referred to (Fogel, 1982) in which circumstantial evidence was defined as a kind of evidence that 
tends to prove a fact based on a reasonable inference in order to link it with a conclusion of fact. 
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that certain facts or circumstances that are usually linked with the hypotheses have 
occurred. Therefore, it is reasonably to infer with certain probability that the given 
hypothesis should not be rejected. But it must consider that the inference can be quite 
convincing depending on the strength of the link between circumstantial evidence and the 
hypothesis.  
Concerning the methodology, this investigation will use ‘analytical narratives’, mainly the 
one that was developed by (Alston et al., 2013). They studied a similar case for Brazil, in 
which they created a conceptual framework with some key concepts to better comprehend 
the way countries broke away of its past. Also, they stressed the validity of this framework 
to study some cases in Latin America. That is why I chose this methodology to analyze the 
Ecuadorian case. The concepts include windows of opportunity, beliefs, leadership, 
institutions and outcomes. But the analysis takes into account the interaction of these 
concepts, since this play a crucial role to better comprehend this issue.  
This Master thesis proceeds as follows: section 2 provides a comprehensive literature 
review. Section 3 presents a description of the methodology and data. Section 4 shows the 
major conceptual framework based on the forthcoming book developed by Lee Alston. 
Section 5 discusses in detail the economic history of Ecuador for the entire period 1950-
2014, divided into three stages 1) 1950-1979; 2) 1980-2006 and 3) 2007-2014. And, section 
6 presents the conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Institutions, Institutional change and Economic Development 
(North, 1990) defines institutions as ‘rules of the game’ in a society, or more specifically 
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. These comprise formal and 
informal rules and its enforcement characteristics
2
. North was the first economist who gave 
prominence to the role of institutions as major determinants of long-term economic 
performance (North, 2005).  
                                                            
2 Formal rules refer to property rights, constitutions, norms and regulations, codified and enforced by 
impersonal mechanisms. Moreover, informal constraints include traditions, taboos, customs, and codes of 
behavior; enforced by personal ties. 
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In this respect, there is a widespread assumption that institutions matter for economic 
development and growth according to mainstream economics (Engerman & Sokoloff, 
2002; Aron, 2000; Acemoglu, et al, 2001; Rodrik 2004). But it is important to consider that 
development is contextual. In other words, the development paths related with successful 
economic development have been promoted by different institutional arrangements. Then, 
which institutions are vital and which are not will vary depending on time and space. 
Likewise (Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004) showed that desirable institutional 
arrangements include specificity of context, which arises from initial conditions and from 
differences in historical and geographical backgrounds. Additionally, there is no perfect 
combination of institutions for all countries, however many development economists agree 
that economic progress requires some specific institutions that must be adapted to local 
circumstances, such as property rights, regulatory institutions, institutions of conflict 
management, and social security institutions (Rodrik, 2000).  
Turning to the main concept of institutions, North said that formal rules reflect the 
ideological belief system of agents, especially those who are strong and influential. His 
investigations showed the topic relevance in theoretical terms. As an illustration, (North & 
Weingast, 1989) analyzed the constitutional arrangements in the seventeenth century in 
England. The political institutions established restrictions on government abuse and 
opportunism to create economic growth. Thereby, institutional change combined the 
institutions with government to achieve the same goals such as protection of property rights 
and social welfare.  
Besides, the interaction of formal and informal rules allows organizations to create 
equilibrium. Thus, a set of beliefs emerge in relation to the institutional environment, in 
which institutions reflects rational behaviors conditioned to social expectations (Fukuyama, 
2006; Calvert, 1995). Similarly (Aoki, 2001) argued that institutions show shared beliefs 
system about expected behavior of individuals. (Greif, 2006; Eggertsson, 2005) also 
emphasized the role of beliefs in order to better understand institutions and institutional 
change.  
Institutional change is a difficult and long process due to complex interactions between 
institutions and organizations with several change horizons. In this sense, institutions are 
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dynamic since they reflect those simultaneous interactions that shape institutional evolution 
(North, 1994). Thus, several authors argue that institutional change is a centralized 
collective choice process in which the rules are specified by the State. So, individuals and 
organizations establish collective actions in order to modify the rules for their own benefit.  
Concerning economic and fiscal policies, these have a crucial role in the sustainability of 
institutional change, since these policies become instruments of government to change and 
improve the 'rules of the game'. But this process takes time because even the best 
institutions do not automatically lead to right policies (Kolodko, 2005; Hasan et al., 2006)  
(Ostrom, 2005) argued that institutional change occurs when individual expectations (cost 
and benefit) match a coalition that in democracies represent the majority. This process 
contains some kinds of hierarchical rules, such as 'operating rules'; the 'collective choice 
rules' and the 'constitutional rules'. Further, there are some obstacles for effective 
institutional change, for example: the bounded rationality of individuals, since some of 
them may have misconceptions about the possible effects of institutional change. They 
prefer institutional innovations derived from successful institutional examples from 
developed world, which do not always work in developing countries.  
Moreover, the powerful groups can hinder institutional change, thereby it is necessary the 
presence of an external authority to enforce negotiations between winners and losers of this 
process. In this vein (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006) create a theory of constitutional change 
that highlights the problem of negotiations. This theory explained how marginalized groups 
use violence to achieve constitutional changes especially in crisis times, which is the right 
moment for negotiations between the leaders and marginalized groups. Leaders commit to 
make reforms as long as the other group does not use violence. But, these commitments are 
not always complied. Likewise, (Levi, 1990) stresses that the formal rules grant power to 
minority groups, so the majority or the marginalized groups may force institutional change 
by their dissatisfaction with existing institutional mechanisms. This discontent can be 
reflected in collective or decentralized actions in society.  
(Alston, 1996) explained that institutional change is the result of the forces of supply 
(government) and demand (voters) in a society because the negotiations between them play 
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a key role in the process. These groups compete to shape the formal rules to their 
advantage, for instance constitutions. Accordingly, political actors reflect the interests of 
the majority groups.  Similarly (Kaufman, 2007) said that policy determines the rules of the 
game and these in turn affect economic performance. Then, rules are often created and 
enforced by the state. In the case that the rules are inadequate, individuals will try to modify 
them through legislation, since the judiciary also plays an important role in the direction of 
institutional change. 
Unlike the authors mentioned above, which explain institutional change as a process based 
on design, there are also extensive literature that assume institutional change as an 
evolutionary process. Therefore, in some economies, transaction costs arise by bounded 
rationality and opportunism of the parties. When the transaction costs are minimal, several 
rules and governance structures can govern effectively. Thus the outcome is predetermined 
because the most efficient institutions are those that emerge and persist (Williamson, 2000).  
Additionally (Veblen, 1899) showed that institutional change is related to the evolution of 
social structure including natural selection of institutions. I.e., a process of natural selection 
of the fittest mental models must adapt to the space through the formation of new 
institutions that includes development of habits of thought. Since it is an evolution; the 
mental models of the past can influence the future process. Furthermore (Hayek, 1973) 
argued that institutional change is based on elections social groups. Thus, the rules of 
conduct evolve because groups that practice them are more successful, and displace other 
less efficient rules. Thereby, through group selection, this configuration of rules evolves 
towards an optimal configuration based on consistent principles, such as: freedom centered 
on protection of property rights. 
(Young, 1996) affirmed that institutional change is a process of punctuated equilibrium, in 
which the history leads to the selection of self-enforcing rules in long periods of stability. 
Then, the appropriate institutions that promote growth arise and persist over time. 
Likewise, (Hodgson, 2004) indicated that the exogenous parameters lead to institutional 
evolution, for example technology changes that cause changes in institutions.  
 7 
 
Regarding to the order of societies, (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009) explored the 
organizational bases for development through an institutional explanation. They describe 
the properties that differentiate limited and open access societies, and also the conditions 
conducive to the transition from one society to another with the objective to achieve 
economic prosperity and political order through violence control. Those societies represent 
the major two social orders in the world. 
Specifically, in limited access orders, the elites control the violence through the creation of 
income from restricting entry into economic and political system. Further, the government 
is centralized and their involvement in the economy is minimal. The market power grows 
and the competition is restricted, property rights are insecure, besides inequality and 
injustice have an increasing trend due to the dominance of social hierarchies and abuses of 
power. On the other hand, open access orders seek social stability through political and 
economic competition. The government is decentralized and has a high participation in the 
economy, there is also enforcement of rule of law, and property rights are secure. Equity 
and equality prevail in society leading to sustainable economic and political development. 
In this context, open access orders are more likely to promote economic growth, sustained 
political development and social stability. Turning to the circumstances that led the 
transition from one social order to another, they established three sets of doorstep 
conditions: 1) rule of law for elites; 2) existence of permanent active organizations; 3) 
political control of the military. In this respect, when a society has achieved most of these 
conditions can be stated that they reached the entrance of open access. Lastly, the authors 
emphasize that the transition is neither an automatic process nor definitive. This process 
must be approved by elites to institutionalize appropriate orders in the country. 
2.1.1. Institutions and Development in Developing Countries 
(North et al., 2013) argues that most developing countries are related to social dynamics of 
limited access orders. Thus, this region face certain challenges; first the development of 
'limited access orders' to achieve the control of violence, more economic growth, greater 
social welfare, and stable outcomes; second, the transition from limited access to an open 
access society through the control of violence and the improvement of living conditions. 
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The transplant of characteristics of open access societies is not enough to succeed; these 
countries have to adapt the key features, such as greater predictability of law enforcement, 
increased revenue, greater equality and high political participation. In this sense, the 
institutions in the developing world vary widely, both in terms enforcement and durability. 
This variation has important implications for the creation and function of proper institutions 
over time (Levitsky & Murillo, 2009). 
(Engerman & Sokoloff, 2002) claimed that in developing countries, the initial factor 
endowments affected emerging institutional structures that mostly hindered development. 
The countries that had the best endowment of resources were selected by the colonizers to 
extract cost effective products, whereas resource-poor regions were chosen for less 
profitable activities. Thus, the different strategies of colonization led to the path 
dependence or institutional persistence. In this context, countries that searched richness and 
power established exclusive institutions. Conversely, those regions that looked for social 
welfare are more likely to develop inclusive institutions, greater openness and hence 
economic growth.   
In addition (Acemoglu et al., 2005) said that the economic performance in the region 
reflects institutional characteristics established in colonial times and inherited by 
postcolonial states. Then, bad economic and political institutions are the central cause of 
economic backwardness. Certainly, developing countries are poor because its institutions 
are defined by a weak structure that does not create incentives and undermines 
development (Hasan et al., 2006). Besides, the poverty in this region is the result of the 
absence of institutional arrangements and the interaction of perverse institutions that are not 
growth promoting (Chu, 2003). In this vein, (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002 and 2008) stated 
that the lack of good institutional features hampers development. Indeed, the cause of 
underdevelopment lies in the predominance of extractive institutions, poor initial conditions 
and resource endowments.    
Finally, in order to solve the problems of underdevelopment, some developing countries 
import the formal rules of a developed country. It will get different outcomes compared to 
the original region, considering changes in informal rules and enforcement features. So, the 
successful transfer of formal rules is not a sufficient condition to generate good economic 
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results since it is necessary an adaptation process and a certain degree of institutional 
innovation (Chang, 2005).  
2.2. Analyzing the impact of Institutions 
Among the most important empirical contributions, (Acemoglu et al., 2002 and Easterly & 
Levine, 2003) affirmed that resource endowments are essential for growth, i.e. elements 
that provide favorable conditions for the emergence or survival of institutions. Also, several 
investigations are based in build-up of historical cases that represent strong explanations 
about how institutions adapt efficiently to seize opportunities (North, Wallis & Weingast, 
2009; Krueger, 1997). Also, comparative historical work highlights the arrangements of 
State to shape the course of institutional change (North, 1990).  
Regarding econometric studies, some of the most acknowledged works (Acemoglu et al., 
2005; Kaufmann, 2004; Glaeser et al., 2004; Rodrik, 2003; Knack & Keefer, 1995) found 
that institutional quality is the determinant of poverty in the developing world. However, 
without dismissing the importance of these works, (Alston, et al 2013) said that researchers 
must be very careful in choosing and using variables to measure institutions because of 
some problems. On one hand, some indicators measure economic performance variables 
that vary over time reflecting a cyclical behavior instead of deeper determinants. On the 
other hand, other indicators are built based on perceptions of experts in certain areas related 
to the analysis of institutions. This includes limitations since these indicators may be 
susceptible to herd behavior
3
. 
For this reason (Alston et al., 2013) developed an analytical narratives methodology to 
analyze the impact of institutions on development. In this respect, the authors argue that 
development is contextual. Developing countries should learn from the most successful 
cases of development. So, the leaders of the countries could take some central ideas of an 
open society and adapt them to their reality. Besides, institutions that are part of open 
societies emerge from a process of belief change over time. So, beliefs are also contextual, 
                                                            
3 Some examples of these kind of indices: ‘aggregate governance index’ developed by (Kaufman et al., 1999), 
‘index of corruption’ developed by Transparency International; ‘economic freedom index’ created by 
Heritage Foundation; ‘international country risk guide’, ‘political risk index’, among others. 
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thus each country experiences these changes in different ways depending on its historical 
background and its resource endowments.  
(Alston et al., 2013) analyzed the Brazilian case in which they argue that this country broke 
with its past and it is in transition to a more open society. This is confirmed by the analysis 
of its economic history over the last 50 years, and the changes in institutions and beliefs 
since 1994.  
In summary, the analytical narratives shows conclusive evidence on institutions and beliefs 
shaping a new trajectory to a more open society, based on an important conceptual 
framework that will be detailed later. 
3. Methodology  
The methodology used in this study is called analytic narratives
4
. It combines a deep 
understanding of the case study with an explicit theoretical framework. The term “analytic” 
refers to quantitative tools; while the term “narrative” concerns a qualitative historical 
presentation of the data. This captures the assumption that theory linked to data is more 
powerful than either data or theory alone. Further, the emergence of this methodology was 
influenced by previous work of Douglass North, since it helps to explain the institutional 
origin and change.   
This Master thesis takes elements established by (Alston et al, 2013) who develops a 
conceptual framework defined by some key concepts for the analysis of similar cases in 
Latin America. These concepts include windows of opportunity, leadership, institutions, 
beliefs and economic and political outcomes. In the case of Ecuador, the framework uses 
the same concepts and it also adds some other concepts based on the country context 
specificity. Also, it is important to consider the interaction of these concepts to comprehend 
the break with the past and the start of a new era.  
                                                            
4 This methodology was first developed by (Bates et al., 1998). 
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In the framework developed by (Alston et al., 2013), the 'analytic narratives' require 
circumstantial evidence to test the hypothesis
5
. This kind of evidence could show that 
certain facts or circumstances that are associated with the hypotheses have occurred. Thus, 
it would be reasonable to infer with certain probability that the given hypothesis should not 
be rejected. But it must consider that the inference can be quite convincing depending on 
the strength of the link between circumstantial evidence and the hypothesis. If the 
relationship is very strong, the case study will have greater relevance.  
To conclude, this method isolates the impact of a theoretical concept in a more detailed and 
potentially more compelling manner (Alston, 2008). Furthermore, ‘analytic narratives’ also 
distinguish between affirmations and predictions. The assertions include past events that are 
analyzed and verified with evidence, while the predictions indicate what the author thinks 
will happen in the future (Alston et al., 2013). 
3.1. Data 
The data used in analytical narratives are qualitative and quantitative. In this sense, 
quantitative data were obtained from various sources based on historical evidence such as 
papers, annual reports of international organizations, publications, economic history books, 
etc. Moreover, quantitative data were obtained from books and reports of Ecuadorian 
statistics, National Institute of Statistics and Census, Central Bank of Ecuador, ECLAC and 
the World Bank. 
4. The Major Conceptual Framework    
Due to the differences in institutions between developed and developing world, it is 
impossible to get a guide that details what are the proper institutions and how to obtain 
them. As (Alston et al., 2013) pointed out, ‘development’ is contextual and ‘institutional 
change’ is rooted in different belief structures that shape the proper set of institutions.  Thus 
each country has to adapt their institutions to their own characteristics based on time and 
space.  
                                                            
5 According to (Alston et al., 2013), analytic narratives do not have significant coefficients but instead 
includes extensive and significant circumstantial evidence, which is largely independent and can be very 
convincing. 
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(Alston et al., 2013) designed a conceptual framework with the objective to deeply 
understand the development paths taken by some countries in Latin America. Indeed, at 
first it was elaborated to comprehend the Brazilian case, but they highlighted its validity to 
understand some cases in the same region, obviously each case with their own results 
depending on context. The key concepts used in its work are: beliefs, leadership, windows 
of opportunity, institutions and economic and political outcomes. In addition, to analyze 
institutions and institutional change it is important to consider the interaction among these 
terms. 
In this respect, the current framework use some terms since these are valuable and 
appropriate to explain the Ecuadorian case. In other words, this framework is modified and 
adapted to the country's reality. This is divided into two groups and other two concepts are 
also added. The first group includes beliefs and customs
6
; while the second group contains 
windows of opportunity, leadership and democracy. Lastly, the other concepts are interest 
groups and international relations. 
4.1 Fundamental Concepts                                
First Group 
 Beliefs 
(Alston et al., 2013) defines ‘beliefs’ as the personal interpretation about the way the world 
works
7
. So, the beliefs generate an explanation of cause and effect, i.e. how different sets of 
institutions generate economic and political outcomes in different contexts. Further, the 
beliefs are contextual and these arise when there is a relationship between institutions and 
its results. 
(North, 1993; 2005) noted that formal institutions reflect the ideological belief systems of 
economic agents. Also, the mental models are essential to shape decisions of leaders, so the 
beliefs should be coherent with the reforms. Since beliefs are subjective views, individuals 
                                                            
6 Beliefs and customs constitute slow-moving institutions that have greater impact to drive institutional 
change since its changes are slow, incremental and continuous (Roland, 2004) 
7 This definition was taken of (North, 2005). 
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assign them an obligation character in order to expand their view to other people. Thus, the 
creation and survival of institutions are supported by the belief system of each country. 
As noted before, there is no guide to obtain the best institutions with positive outcomes 
because of the high level of uncertainty. In a positive scenario, leaders get the expected 
results, so the dominant beliefs are strengthened. Conversely, if they do not get the 
anticipated outcomes, the dominant beliefs will be weakened and its power will decline.  
The most important belief belongs to leaders, since they can seize the emergence of the 
window of opportunity and make timely decisions about the implementation of new 
institutions. But the beliefs of citizens should complement the leader’s belief. In this regard, 
citizens may support or restrict the power of the leaders, according to their own benefit 
(Alston et al., 2013). So, leaders must consider that the institutions must be consistent with 
national beliefs in order to obtain expected results. 
 Customs 
According to (North, 1991), the ‘customs’ are considered one of the informal constraints 
that shape human interaction. Indeed, the 'customs' establish incentives and limitations for 
individual actions. 
Similarly to ‘beliefs’; this concept helps to understand how the world works. Whereby, the 
‘customs’ largely explains the establishment and implementation of rules in a society. 
Then, the way citizens interpret and appreciate the rules has the same importance as the 
incentives and constraints in society. Thereby, the process of social interaction is built 
through valuation rules, in which developmental trajectories are shaped by the 'customs' 
(Hodgson, 2006).  
The structure of beliefs is closely linked with the incentives and constraints for individual 
decision making. This structure helps to create 'customs' and preferences that should be 
consistent with its spread. So, the establishment of the ‘customs’ represents the root of 
beliefs in society. In this respect, beliefs are usually rationalizations of feelings and 
emotions emerging from the 'customs' established by the individual behavior (Wood et al., 
2002)  
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The decisions made by leaders are internalized in the preferences and these are replicated 
through individual behavior. In that way, the 'customs' provide a normative weight to 
political decisions and stabilize institutional imbalance. Also, the normative power of a 
custom is explained through human interaction, in which beliefs are based on pursuit of 
welfare, as a result it represents social power. 
Certainly, the prevalence of institutions is embedded in the customs of society, whereby it 
is required institutional change to get expected results and achieve development in Latin 
America. 
Second Group 
 Window of Opportunity 
A window of opportunity is a short period of time in which there is a unique opportunity. It 
should be exploited at the right time, in which immediate action is paramount. So, once the 
window of opportunity closes, the opportunity vanishes forever. 
The window of opportunity arises when the economic and political outcomes differ from 
expectations (Alston et al., 2103). This opportunity allows changing institutions due to 
malleability of beliefs. In this sense, it fosters the beginning of a process of change. 
The leaders should take advantage of the window of opportunity. They have the chance to 
modify institutions according to the dominant beliefs. Nevertheless, the windows of 
opportunity are not always exploited, due to the lack of natural leaders or blocking of 
changes. Therefore, the economic or political outcomes could also be negatives. Further, 
the prevalence of past beliefs affects the relationship between institutions and outcomes. As 
an illustration, the crises represent windows of opportunity, but the crises are not a 
necessary condition for its emergence (Alston et al., 2013). 
The windows of opportunity appear in three specific scenarios. First, when rental streams 
are not sufficient or otherwise exceed the expectations of leaders. Second, a new member 
enters into the group of leaders, as a result of unintentional crisis that could be economic or 
politic. And third, the beliefs of leaders change due to an exogenous shock or changes in 
outcomes (Alston et al., 2013). To sum up, the leader through the window of opportunity 
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plays a crucial role in the pursuit of sustainable development. The interaction with their 
beliefs and customs provide relevance to the concept. 
 Leadership 
'Leadership' refers to certain individuals or organizations that seize the windows of 
opportunity and make difference due to their decisions and actions in country´s history. The 
leadership is necessary for institutional change to the extent in which the leader is able to 
conduct their preferences through belief structure. The leader must have the ability to form 
alliances or coalitions to support their choices.  
Further, the ‘leadership’ alone does not work; this concept also requires interaction with 
other terms such as respect and citizen support. The main objective is to promote an initial 
change to achieve expected outcomes regarding institutional strengthening and belief 
deepening. In this vein, the interaction between leadership and window of opportunity is 
quite important. Thus, the leader should seize the window of opportunity to decide whether 
or not the country should take another path (Alston et al., 2013). When the country enters in 
that path, institutional changes must be reinforced through time. If this process is 
successful, it will affect the belief structure, and as a result, it will allow the establishment 
of more institutional changes in the future. 
The leaders are considered drivers of institutional change through the use of windows of 
opportunity. One interesting factor is its ability to solve problems rooted in the past. 
Nonetheless, leaders may also be wrong, and their decisions could lead to unintended 
negative results due to the high element of uncertainty about future. 
The interaction of the core concepts leads to success of the leader. To understand this 
assumption, before being a leader, this person or organization must recognize the existence 
of the window of opportunity, and then it must establish decisions and expect results 
consistent with their beliefs. To sum up, the leadership is the ability to lead a country to 
success or failure.  
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 Democracy 
Most studies on the relationship between institutions and economic development has been 
carried out on the basis of political structure and the role of government in each country. In 
this way the government challenge is to provide a good leadership to solve institutional 
weakness. That is, a commitment to create and implement development policies in the 
benefit of all citizens, stressing the importance of democracy. 
For instance, in order to have an empirical notion of this concept, (Rodrik, 2000)analyzed 
data for 90 countries in the period 1970 until 1989. He found that the countries 
characterized by democratic regimes were more able to have long-term growth rates. Also 
these countries could better manage external shocks, create greater short-term stability and 
promote a fair distribution of income. In this context it is clear that the best results come 
from those countries with democratic regimes since these nations produce institutions with 
greater capacity to adapt to local conditions. Thus, democracies create better institutional 
outcomes because these establish greater equity in the nations especially in social sectors 
such as education and health.  
Moreover, democracies are considered meta-institutions because these help to build better 
societies with the proper institutional arrangements (Rodrik, 2000). In addition, 
participatory democracy creates better institutions providing the basis for sustainable 
economic development. This concept also requires interaction of several terms, i.e. the 
presence of a good leader, the window of opportunity and strong belief structure. 
This investigation uses the perception of (Rodrik, 2000), in which "democracies" work 
better than others regimes under several circumstances. In addition, democracies best 
handled crisis periods and the leaders get distributive results to achieve social welfare. 
To Summarize: this section contains a separation of concepts in two different groups in 
order to better comprehend the definition and association between them. However, the 
development of the analytic narratives will not include a distinction between groups, 
because the crucial part of this approach is the interaction of concepts. In this sense, the 
interaction is fundamental to understand the way some countries have been separated from 
their past since these concepts alone do not generate the expected changes. 
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In this respect (Alston et al., 2013) emphasizes that windows of opportunity can be used by 
leaders, who may change the institutions to generate more open societies. It has also been 
proven that well-established democracies generated better economic and political 
outcomes. But it is not a fundamental requirement in all cases. Moreover, customs and 
beliefs play an important role in shaping institutional changes. 
Consequently, considering that 'development' is contextual; this framework adds two more 
concepts that increase the possibility to collect extensive circumstantial evidence. These are 
interest groups and international relations. Unlike earlier concepts, these new concepts do 
not have a theoretical analysis, but rather introduce an initial idea for the Ecuadorian case. 
 Interest groups  
In Ecuador, the interest groups influence economic and political outcomes through time. 
These are the church, agrarian elite, the military, political parties, business society, 
transnational corporations, urban and rural working class, middle class, among others. 
Indeed its participation level and influence could be explained by the period in which they 
developed. 
Certain groups have established alliances with less influential groups in order to gain more 
power. These groups have not promoted national development because their concern has 
been the private accumulation. In this regard, the interest groups can interrupt institutional 
changes for their own benefit (Vasconéz et al, 2005) 
The changes of beliefs directly influence the decision of interest groups. Since they could 
choose to keep or change certain institutions in order to obtain the desired results (Alston et 
al., 2013).  So, these new beliefs should modify the bad customs of interest groups and thus 
divert their personal interests towards community interests. 
 International relations 
International relations have focused primarily on the United States. On one hand, the 
relationships are based on mutual interests focused on maintaining democratic institutions, 
investment, infrastructure, financial ties, etc. On the other hand, U.S repeatedly forces to 
Ecuador to accept their conditions through diplomatic pressure and non-peaceful actions.  
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During certain governmental periods the relations with United States were stronger in 
comparison with others. For example, during the government of Rodrigo Borja (1988-
1992) international relations were more diversified, it included developing countries, 
Western Europe, socialist countries and multilateral organization (U.S. Library of 
Congress, 2014). Conversely, in the current government the relations with U.S have 
weakened due to several conflicts related to immigration, drug issues trade relations and 
attacks to sovereignty (Ponce, 2004). 
5. Development of ‘Analytical Narratives’                                                                                       
Case Study: Ecuador, 1950-2014                                                         
Considering the conceptual framework, this section analyzes Ecuadorian economic history 
since the 50s, stressing that this country broke with its past. The interaction of concepts is 
crucial to understand the way beliefs and institutions evolve in order to establish the start of 
a new trajectory. 
The complete historical period is divided into three stages; first: 1950-1979, it was 
characterized by agricultural booms, constant struggles between powerful groups and 
dictatorships; second: 1980-2006, it was centered on the return of democracy, oil boom and 
several economic and political crises. The third and final period: 2007-2014 represents the 
break with the past characterized by changes in beliefs, institutions and outcomes.  
5.1. The Extractive Economy: An Endless Story, 1950-1979                                  
The Problem of Limited Economic Prosperity  
Since the early 50's, Ecuador experienced a profound economic change based on banana 
boom. This country exploited its comparative advantage obtained by bad weather 
conditions and pests in Central America. As a result, the exports rose dramatically due the 
strong links with international markets, mainly United States and Europe. This external 
demand was fundamental to sustain the banana boom (Montalvo, 2013). 
The economic prosperity revitalized the domestic market and transformed the coastal 
agricultural region. To some extent, this boom brought better conditions for workers, thus it 
introduced the concept of agricultural wage labor that did not exist before the 50s. In 
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addition, the banana boom with demographic pressures prompted the emergence of an 
urbanization process (Espinosa, 2010). The next table shows the growth rate of Ecuadorian 
population during the period 1950-1962. The urbanization process is explained by the high 
rates of urban population. Certainly, the rural population abandoned its territory in order to 
move to more productive areas, such as Coast and Amazon. 
Table. No. 1                                                                                                                            
Growth Rate Population, 1950-1962 
 
 Country   The Highlands   The Coast   Amazon    Galapagos Islands  
 Total Population                2,95                      2,09               4,11                 3,98                             4,79  
 Urban Population                4,73                      3,56               5,89                 5,23                               -    
 Rural Population                2,12                      2,37               3,10                 3,79                             4,79  
Source: Ayala, 1990. 
Concerning the international relations, United States financed the production and marketing 
of bananas during the boom. This country helped Ecuador to overcome its difficulties. At 
first glance, this aid seemed adequate, but in reality it constituted another mechanism to 
strengthen external dependence (Acosta, 2012). There is no doubt that the U.S has helped 
Ecuador many times, but it also has plunged the country into underdevelopment due to its 
capitalist relations. 
The next sections will indicate that economic prosperity brought many positive results, 
including strengthening of domestic market, urbanization process, improved road network, 
expansion of agricultural frontier, etc (Acosta, 2012). But, the existence of powerful groups 
unbalanced the profit distribution in the society. While exporters earned the most of 
income, the workers and producers together received only slightly more than half of the 
national value added. These facts contradicted the positive outcomes; therefore Ecuador did 
not overcome the substantial problems of underdevelopment. This country was led by 
extractive institutions that only favored minority groups. 
 Industrialization Process through Modernization Theory 
Latin America including Ecuador undertook the challenge towards development through 
the establishment of the import substitution model (ISI model). The Economic Commission 
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for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) was directly responsible for their promotion 
and establishment (Naranjo, 2005). 
The ISI model represented the Latin American version of ‘Modernization Theory’ taken 
from developed countries. It was focused on industrialization as the solution to achieve 
development through sustained economic growth. Thereby, the new development thinking 
was against the primary exporting models due to its inability to generate value added, high 
income concentration in minority groups and high dependence on international market 
fluctuations (Correa, 2014). 
In Ecuador, this model did not have the expected results due to poor national situation 
(decline of the banana boom at early 60's) and the inability of elites to achieve their 
objectives. In this respect, the domestic market was not boosted, the wealth and income 
were not redistributed, the flow of capital was not guaranteed and tariff policy was not 
adequate to drive the industry.  
 Role of Government 
The ISI model promoted an active State role, mainly in planning and promotion of 
investments in strategic sectors. Nevertheless, in 1954, ECLAC through the report called 
"The Economic Development in Ecuador" stated that Ecuadorian government failed to lead 
the process of active intervention in economic activity due to instability of their institutions 
and the weakness of entrepreneurial economic system (Mayoral, 2009) 
To solve that problem Ecuador introduced a planning process by the creation of a control 
organization called 'Planning Board' that was created to advise the government about 
development plans with economic coordination
8
 (Moncada, 1974). Regarding economic 
policy instruments, the government ordered a devaluation to increase export profits and 
competitiveness. It transferred export revenues to other economic areas, thus it increased 
public investment, especially in road networks that favored national integration, the 
development of major cities and the emergence of middle classes (Hurtado, 1997).  
                                                            
8 The ECLAC studies influenced the creation of such plans, particularly: 'Plan for Economic and Social 
Development 1964-1973' and 'National Plan for Transformation and Development 1973-1977'(Correa, 2014) 
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Regrettably, the effects were not always positive, the infrastructure investment increased 
dependence on imports of capital goods that caused deficit of trade balance. The Graph. 
No. 1 shows that the terms of trade declined and caused huge instability in international 
markets from 1955. These difficulties reached a critical level in the mid-60s, so from 1964 
the trade balance turned negative until 1971. Imports grew significantly compared to 
banana exports (Acosta, 2012). As a consequence, once again the international companies 
concentrated its demand in Central America since this region overcame its problems 
concerning plagues and diseases. 
Graph. No. 1                                                                                                                                        
Trade Balance, 1950 – 1972                                                                                                                   
Millions of dollars
                     
Source: Central Bank of Ecuador, Monthly statistical information, 1995 
 External Debt 
In 1953, Ecuador was able to renegotiate its foreign debt due to abundant economic 
resources derived from banana boom. This debt grew to 83.4 million at the end of the 50's. 
But, this growth was moderate considering the limited ability to pay and the low level of 
foreign capital.  
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In this sense, the Graph. No. 2 indicates the upward trend of external debt that almost 
quadrupled in this decade. The large infrastructure investments caused problems for debt 
payment, though these public works were necessary, it increased the benefits of elite, so it 
negatively impacted to the society. 
Graph. No. 2                                                                                                                                        
External Debt, 1950 – 1960                                                                                                  
Source: Acosta, 2012                                                                                                                                                                                                           
* Final balance = initial balance + payments + adjustments for exchange rate variation - amortization.                                                                                                               
**Includes amortization and actual interest. 
 Another attempt to industrialize through Agrarian Reform 
The military junta ruled Ecuador during the period 1963-1966, this government promoted 
social and economic order, since they wanted to modernize capitalism through the 
implementation of the 'Alliance for Progress'. It was a program of economic, political and 
social aid created by United States for Latin America. 
This government fostered the 'Developmental State Model' centered on increasing external 
revenues and industrialization. Since 1964, the government continued to invest in road 
networks, mainly in the regions of high economic activity. In the same year, the first 
Agrarian Reform was established to alleviate pressure on land and solve the problem of low 
productivity (Gondard & Mazurek, 2001). Although its impact on land distribution was 
limited, the Agrarian Reform eliminated precarious forms of work, particularly the 
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institution of hacienda called 'huasipungo'
9
. This reform boosted the industrialization 
process through low prices of raw materials, primarily for urban areas.  
At this stage, two major groups of interest influenced this process, so the Catholic Church 
and the landowners divided their haciendas in order to prevent loss of power and continue 
profiting from their productive activities.  
As a consequence of industrialization, the agriculture lost significance. To solve this 
problem, the Government proposed several projects of land reform in order to encourage 
the expansion of livestock and modern production. Despite the efforts made, the military 
government did not achieve the expected results concerning modernization and national 
development. They failed to address social demands. Once more, the country was going 
through high economic, social and political instability. Also the income distribution was 
inexistent, only the minority groups were benefited above most of the population. And, the 
poverty was very high, especially in rural areas.    
 The Emergence of a new 'Extractivism'10: The Oil Boom   
The hydrocarbons potential of Ecuador began to attract the attention of transnational 
corporations that were looking for new oil sources worldwide.  Ecuador once again opted 
for the exploitation of resources due to external needs and not for domestic reasons. The oil 
exports caused rapid economic growth that improved the productive structure of the 
country. Thereby, it eased negative effects caused by the decline of banana production, and 
political conflicts between dominant groups from the Sierra and Coast (Bocco, 1987). 
Furthermore, the strong presence of ‘dictatorships’ shaped the oil era during this decade. 
José María Velasco Ibarra was proclaimed dictator in 1970 after democratically govern for 
three years (1968 -1970). He was overthrown by a military coup in 1972 and Guillermo 
Rodriguez Lara replaced him as dictator. 
Definitely it was the end of an era for the beginning of another. The historical 
disappearance of 'Velasquismo'
11
, implied leaving behind the characteristics of a country: 
                                                            
9 Huasipungo is a piece of land that the landowner gave the Indians in exchange for agricultural work. 
10 It explains the way of organizing a country's economy, based on the exportation of commodities such as 
fossil fuels, minerals and agricultural products. 
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closed geographically; culturally rural; poor and socially lagging; and closer to autarky than 
to development (De la Torre, 1993).  
During the 70s, Ecuador strengthened the 'Developmental State Model' that was 
implemented by the Military Junta in the 60s. This model was based on 'ECLAC features', 
thus the country was commercially opened through the ISI model and industrialization 
(Ramos, 2013). In addition, for the first time in history the Ecuadorian Government 
obtained autonomy with regard to powerful groups, mainly: exporting firms. 
Therefore, the domestic market grew significantly while the old social and cultural patterns 
were extinguished. The State involvement and new economic growth areas caused an 
increase of workforce and the emergence or strengthened of dominant groups: the 'golden 
bureaucracy'
12
, and the 'middle class'. The social opportunities increased due to the huge 
economic revenues obtained from petroleum. 
As a result of high revenues in the industrial sector, the population migrated from rural 
areas to major cities (Quito and Guayaquil). These factors contributed with past 
urbanization process and the increase in labor market (Espinosa, 2010). Accordingly, the 
Table. No. 2 indicates the growth rate population, confirming the urbanization process.  
Table. No. 2                                                                                                                         
Growth Rate Population, 1974-1982 
 
 Country   The Highlands   The Coast   Amazon    Galapagos Islands  
 Total Population                  2,52                    2,23               2,54            4,94                          4,91  
 Urban Population                  4,48                    4,06               4,68          10,84                          7,62  
 Rural Population                  0,91                    0,93               0,33            3,70                        (0,30) 
Source: Ayala, 1990. 
These changes were misperceived in the 'modernization theory' that asserted that 
development is associated with high levels of urbanization (Correa, 2014). Ecuador had the 
conditions to be considered an urban society, but it did not reflect the serious economic, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
11
 Velasquismo refers to periods in which Velasco Ibarra took power in Ecuador. The government periods 
were: (1934-1935), (1944-1947), (1952-1956), (1960-1961) and (1968-1972). 
12 It refers to sectors with privileged wages that produce conflicts and endurance with other bureaucratic 
groups. 
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political and social obstacles bedeviling the country. The concept of development involves 
many other factors that create lasting institutional changes and further establishes certain 
beliefs that transform societies. 
The country experienced some problems in manufacturing sector that hindered jobs 
generation. So, unemployment and underemployment increased and new forms of poverty 
appeared. Contradictorily, all negative consequences occurred in the period of greatest 
wealth of Ecuadorian economy. 
Besides, the military triumvirate promoted trade liberalization and prioritized the inflation 
control, which fell from 23% in 1974 to 10% in 1979 (Mayoral, 2009). Regarding the 
relationship between GDP and inflation, the next graph indicates the historical evolution of 
these indicators over the period 1973-1980. Clearly, both trends are decreasing, reflecting 
two important events. First, the reduction in the inflation rate confirms the State's concern 
to reduce this indicator. Second, the downward trend in GDP shows some economic 
instability despite inflation control. 
Graph. No. 3                                                                                                                                       
GDP vs. Inflation, 1973 – 1980                                                                                                                                                 
Percentages (%)                               
   Source: Central Bank of Ecuador, 1997. 
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In short, the 70s were marked by an enormous instability and poor living conditions, such 
as: bad road networks, poor energy service, lack of capital and technology, high levels of 
illiteracy, poor distribution of social wealth, corrupt governments, among others (Ramos, 
2013). 
 Important Facts & Figures that showed the start of new era 
During the whole decade (1971-1980) due to petroleum, the total exports amount grew 
from $199 million to $2.506 million. This trend increased over time and it showed the huge 
significance for its economy (Ramos, 2013). In the case of imports, these grew from $348 
million to $2.476 million in the same period. In this regard, Ecuador did not have a real 
process of import substitution; rather it was a process of reproduction of imports that 
caused an overvaluation of national currency.   
The Graph No.4 indicates that exports and imports grew at approximately the same rate. 
But, there are periods when imports exceed exports, showing a high dependence on imports 
of capital goods. 
Graph. No. 4                                                                                                                            
Exports and Imports, 1971 -1989                                                                                                 
                  
Source: Ramos, 2013 
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Since 1972, Ecuadorian government won many petrodollars
13
. These economic resources 
were used irresponsibly because the State increased social spending; public investment and 
urban consumerism without consider the future consequences. As a consequence of this 
reckless behavior, the government resorted to external financing to solve the problems of 
high expenditures. Indeed, since 1976, Ecuador and other Latin American countries began a 
period of "aggressive borrowing'
14
. This process was led by international and multilateral 
lending agencies to regularize the excess liquidity in developed countries (Naranjo, 2005).  
External debt increased significantly, mainly in the second half of the 70s. Specifically, in 
1971 -1975 the external debt/GDP ratio accounted for 4.4%, this proportion remained 
steady for some years. Nonetheless, during the oil boom the figures had changed, in 1976 
that percentage rose at 5.7%, in 1978 it increased to 16.9%, and in 1979 this ratio increased 
at 28.6% (Ramos, 2013). The following graph shows the dramatic rise of external debt over 
the period. Also, it can be seen the start of 'aggressive borrowing' since 1976. 
Graph. No. 5                                                                                                                                       
External debt, 1971 – 1980                                                                                                                      
Millions of dollars
Source: Central Bank of Ecuador, Monthly statistical information 
 
                                                            
13  U.S. Dollar earned through the sale of oil. 
14 This term refers to debts incurred by the irresponsible rulers in the 70s; these debts grew unceasingly and 
created a huge instability in Latin American countries. 
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 A Closer Look to the Core Concepts 
To better understand the facts and circumstantial evidences described above, it is necessary 
to specify the dominant belief and interaction of the key concepts found over the period 
1950-1979. 
To start is essential to explain the legacy of Spanish colonization in Ecuador (XVI century), 
since the economic performance reflects the institutional characteristics inherited since 
those times (Acemoglu et al., 2005). The colonization led to the establishment of a 
hierarchical society in which white people and people of color were separated by deep 
economic and social differences. It was impossible to change the place in social scale and 
the living conditions. The citizens took for granted their reality and unfortunately they did 
not have the power to change it. Thus, the social hierarchies implanted the belief in 
permanent social status. This belief restricted property rights and equal opportunities for all 
individuals. 
Thus, the beliefs and customs of Ecuadorians were characterized by little interest in 
economic progress. The country did not have appropriate institutional arrangements, such 
as respect for property rights and enforcement of rules and regulations (Hurtado, 2013). As 
a consequence, the customs and the dominant belief restricted social welfare, business 
progress, and national development. These were some of the direct outcomes of the belief 
in permanent social status. The people did not strive to change their lives, because they 
believed that inherited social status could never be changed.  
Nevertheless, since 1950 the dominant beliefs and customs changed as a result of the 
expansion of entrepreneurship in coastal areas by the banana boom. Economic, political and 
social changes contributed to the increase of interest in the work and rent seeking. 
Definitely this time was characterized by strong cultural change that was promoted by 
economic growth resulting from the banana and oil exports. 
The period 1950-1979 represented three consecutive decades of impressive economic 
growth, which transformed all orders of national life. So Ecuador left the group of the most 
backward countries in Latin America. This era was characterized by high economic 
prosperity, agricultural improvement and strengthening of physical infrastructure. As an 
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illustration, the Graph No. 6 indicates the relationship between GDP and exports. The GDP 
increased significantly, thus it demonstrates the continuous economic growth in the period. 
Similarly, the exports grew largely and this reflects the relevance of the extractivism in 
Ecuadorian economy. 
Graph. No. 6                                                                                                                                      
GDP vs. Exports, 1950 – 1979                                                                                            
Millions of dollars 
Source: Central Bank of Ecuador, 1997. 
The dominant belief in permanent social status disappeared as a result of economic 
progress and the consequent improvement of living conditions, such as the spread of social 
services. Moreover, political parties and coalitions promoted laws and reforms aimed at 
correcting unfair economic and political relationships. But often these ideas hampered 
national development due to conflicts between interest groups (Hurtado, 2013). 
In the 60s, ECLAC and the 'Alliance for Progress' promoted structural reforms focused on 
strengthening government participation to achieve development and redistribution of 
wealth. Additionally, the elimination of 'huasipungo' and Agrarian Reform improved the 
living conditions of peasants. 
The State through the Planning Board established favorable conditions for national 
development through planning, projects implementation, public investment, business 
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formation, institution building and implementation of protectionist measures. These events 
were promoted by the State autonomy, as a consequence of oil revenues (Hurtado, 2013). 
In addition, the 1979 Constitution instituted the regime of political parties, which 
prioritized their ideology and program principles. This formal institution put an end to the 
dictatorships era. Moreover, this Constitution promoted national rights, including the vote 
for illiterates, thus a type social discrimination was eliminated, and the society was 
revalorized to some extent. 
The social behavior changed, as an illustration the peasants wanted to get the most out from 
their land to improve their life quality. As a consequence, a new belief emerged, that was 
the belief in personal and national development. This belief arose as a result of the 
importance of this concept, the relentless pursuit of enrichment and the application of 
‘Developmental State model’. Besides it was the outcome of change in customs due to the 
economy prosperity for three decades. This belief contributed to the expansion of the 
virtuous circle of economic growth, in which some people escaped poverty. But, it did not 
eliminate the problem of social differences.  
The creation of the 'Planning Board' in 1954 established a window of opportunity because 
beliefs of the leaders changed when they gave prominence to the state planning. In addition, 
the economic environment was conducive to promote better outcomes through the 
emergence of new belief in personal and national development. The citizens wanted to 
improve their lifestyle and worked to get the most benefit, unfortunately the leadership was 
not sustainable and the window of opportunity was wasted. 
Furthermore, some governments in this period had a populist ideology centered on 
demagogic speeches and unrealistic promises. According to (Ayala S. , 2014), populism is 
the shortcut to economic prosperity, but it never works. Consequently, democracy was 
absent due to strong presence of dictatorships in the 70’s. Also, interest groups hampered 
development because of the desire for absolute power without considering social welfare.  
The international relations with U.S through the 'Alliance for Progress' increased external 
dependence and the country entered into the most aggressive stage of indebtedness. Thus, 
in the late 70s, the belief in personal and national development faded, mainly due to 
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declining booms and the absence of democracy. The unfavorable conditions, bad customs 
and the disappearance of the dominant belief limited the Ecuadorian development, likewise 
the lack of leadership and the existence of antagonistic interest groups overshadowed the 
richest time in Ecuadorian economy. 
5.2. The Return to Democracy for misconceived reasons, 1980 -2006 
This period started with the return to democracy, but this regime arose for the wrong 
reasons. The bourgeoisie was concerned about the protection of their interests, because 
modernization led by authoritarianism weakened its dominance in the country. Thus, elites 
chose democracy as the best way to restore its power and its political influence in Ecuador. 
As a result, Ecuadorian governments were corrupt and extremely indifferent to economic 
and social problems (Naranjo, 2005). 
Jaime Roldós inaugurated a new democratic era in Ecuador as the first elected president 
after several dictatorships. Still, the return to democracy was strictly controlled by the 
armed forces. The legitimate democracy 'by and for' the people was far from being 
achieved due to lack of political commitment. Then, the situation worsened by the 
continuous dispute between the three branches of government, political party fragmentation 
and regionalism. To solve this problem, Roldós tried to build a reorganization process 
through the establishment of a new progressive Constitution. As noted in the last period, 
the 1979 Constitution promoted civil liberties and emphasized the transformation of 
Ecuadorian democracy to consolidate the country's institutionalization.  
Further, Ecuador began a process of greater international integration through the 
establishment of stabilization and adjustment policies within the mainstream of 
'neoliberalism'. These policies were based on an enterprise development model, so the 
market was quite important in the economy. These measures were established and 
deepened during the period 1981-1996 (Ayala & Fernández, 1995).  
Concerning external shocks, the delimitation of frontiers between Ecuador and Peru was 
considered a serious national problem since it triggered short wars between them in the 
years 1981 and 1995. It generated high public spending on national defense, weak trade 
relations with Peru, and even worse several material and human losses.  
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Moreover, Ecuador suffered the effects from international crisis in the 80s. The 
governments of developed countries implemented some contractionary macroeconomic 
policies that caused deterioration of exports. As an illustration in 1980 the price per oil 
barrel cost $35.2, this figure fell sharply in 1986 in which the price per barrel fell to $12.80. 
The next graph illustrates the downward trend of the oil prices. This fact negatively 
affected to Ecuadorian economy since it was highly dependent on oil exports. 
Graph. No. 7                                                                                                                                      
Oil Prices, 1980 – 1988                                                                                                        
Export price (US$ per barrel)
Source: Central Bank of Ecuador.                                                                                                                                                                                             
The economic downturn in Latin America was not only a consequence of the international 
factors. Their governments applied several economic policies that caused a rise of external 
debt. The external economic resources were aimed to finance an irresponsible domestic 
spending. Specifically, monetary policies negatively impacted investment and consumption 
due to high interest rates. And, price stabilization policies affected investment and trade 
balance (Pacheco, 1985) 
During the 80s, Ecuador entered into a recession period caused by the decline of oil boom 
and the disruption of international credit. This crisis was deepened by external shocks, such 
as the strong winter in 1983 that destroyed the coastal agricultural production, and in 1987 
a great earthquake damaged the Ecuadorian pipeline. The last event weakened exports and 
this stopped for six months the oil industry (Ayala E. , 2008).  
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In 1983, the burden of external debt was exacerbated by the application of the 
‘sucretization’. It represented a direct subsidy granted by the government to the private 
sector. In other words, the Ecuadorian State assumed private debt to protect the labor sector 
of these enterprises. But conversely it brought some negative consequences to the country 
(Acosta, 2008). 
Since 1984, through neoliberal policies, the government of Febres Cordero built an 
enterprise development model based on interests of private business. Also, this government 
eradicated industrialization through trade liberalization and the elimination of the 
institutional framework that supported ISI model. This government had several conflicts 
with opposition groups, who reported numerous cases of government corruption and human 
rights violations. Consequently, the State used coercive force to stop the protests, but it 
violated the Constitution by strong abuse of power (Roldós, 1986). 
In 1988, a new government led by Rodrigo Borja, took the same neoliberal tendency to rule 
the country. He proposed a several reforms to liberalize the market and boost labor sector. 
But, it failed to perform the proposed socioeconomic changes, despite the power domain in 
Congress, Supreme Court and control agencies. In this sense, he had enough power to 
overcome some national problems. It was not a window of opportunity, but Borja could 
have achieved a significant national progress. However, this president wasted this chance. 
Referring to outcomes, this government brought positive and negative results, such as 
integration to international market, implementation of guarantees of freedom for expression 
and human rights and the application of several social programs. Conversely, external debt 
grew; the cost of living worsened and weakened the productive apparatus. 
 Facts & Figures that showed the Severe Effects of the Crisis 
During the period 1981-1990, GDP dropped 18%, thus GDP per capita decreased by 5.7%, 
receding to the same levels of the mid-70s. In real terms, the GDP fell from $14.000 
million in 1981 to $9.000 million in 1989 (Correa, 2014). The Graph No.8 indicates the 
downward trend of this indicator.  
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Graph. No. 8                                                                                                                                      
GDP, 1981-1989                                                                                                                      
Millions of Dollars 
Source: Acosta, 2012. 
Ecuador experienced one of its worst crisis determined by rapid growth of poverty levels 
and strong social polarization due to income deterioration. Furthermore, the growth of the 
urban labor supply was worsened by the lack of sector dynamism, reflected in high levels 
of unemployment and underemployment (Pita, 2000). In 1990, only 44% of the workforce 
had a decent job, while 6% of the economically active population was unemployed and 
50% were underemployed.  The table No. 3 shows how the crisis affected the labor market 
in Ecuador, thus unemployment and underemployment rose to substantial figures. 
Table No. 3                                                                                                                
Underemployment and Unemployment, 1980-1999                                                                       
% of Economically Active Population 
Year (% EAP) 
1980 35,2 
1981 40,1 
1982 44,5 
1983 49,5 
1984 48,1 
1985 52,5 
1986 56 
1987 51,3 
1988 48,5 
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Year (% EAP) 
1989 49,4 
1990 55,9 
1991 62,8 
1992 56,8 
1993 55,5 
1994 53,6 
1995 52,8 
1996 53,8 
1997 50,5 
1998 54 
1999 62,9 
Source: Naranjo, 2005                                                                                                                                                                                             
Moreover, the external public debt rose to unprecedented levels, increased from $4.600 
million in 1981 to $15.900 in 1999, it was the result of refinancing and capitalization of 
interest arrears (Acosta, 2012). The oil boom and external debt did not generate the 
expected structural changes that were intended to create the basis for sustainable 
development in Ecuador. Indeed, Ecuador became more dependent on international 
resources. The Graph No. 9 shows the evolution of Ecuador's foreign debt in the crisis 
period that was dramatically increasing. 
Graph. No. 9                                                                                                                  
External Debt, 1980 – 1990                                                                                                         
Millions of dollars
                                                                                                                                                                       
Source: Naranjo, 2005                                                                                                                                                                                                         
* Final balance of the debt + interest 
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Referring to social spending, Ecuadorian population had experienced remarkable 
improvements in their standard of living during the 70s and the first half of the 80s as a 
result of the oil boom. But since the late 80s and early 90s, public investment in social areas 
decreased, coinciding with the most difficult stages of external debt and fiscal issues 
(Naranjo, 2005). The following table shows that public investment has not increased over 
time. In fact, it has remained almost constant with slight decrease in some years, so in the 
entire period this figure was approximately 4% in education and culture, and 1% in health 
and community development. 
Table No. 4                                                                                                                                                                    
Public Investment (% of GDP), 1986-1999 
Year 
Education 
and Culture 
Health and Community 
Development 
1986 4 1,1 
1987 3,9 1,4 
1988 3,3 1,3 
1989 3 1,2 
1990 2,7 1,2 
1991 2,9 0,9 
1992 3,1 1 
1993 2,6 0,7 
1994 2,9 0,9 
1995 3,3 1,1 
1996 3,2 1,2 
1997 3,5 1 
1998 3,2 1 
1999 3,8 1,2 
Source: Naranjo, 2005 
 The Problem of Unstable Governments  
In the early 90s, the country followed the same economic trend of the 80s: 'neoliberalism'. 
It was centered on economic policy proposals promoted by Washington Consensus. Also, 
this period was characterized by strong influence of U.S government and transnational 
corporations (Falconí & Oleas, 2004).  
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Indeed, Washington Consensus was the second economic model that replaced Import 
Substitution model. Within this framework, the structural reforms were focused on trade 
liberalization, minimum role of the State and strong promotion of market measures 
(Laferriere, 2003). But the adjustment measures of this model provoked unexpected 
outcomes such as: high levels of poverty and social exclusion, macroeconomic imbalances, 
low per capita economic growth, trade deficit, institutional failure and unequal wealth 
distribution.  These results reinforced exclusionary and concentration tendencies. 
These results were part and consequence of an institutionalism sustained on paternalism, 
rent-seeking, corruption and impunity. Many studies show that the adjustment policies 
constituted aspects of social instability because these did not consider democracy and 
distributional factors (Páez, 2000).  
At that time, the 'individualism' became a high virtue, 'competition' in mode of life and the 
'market' in a strong driver of people and societies. Any planning programs or collective 
actions were rejected (Correa, 2014). In this context, the belief in culture stability was 
imposed to counter the desire for social change. 
In 1994, the Agrarian Development Law was imposed to fix the problems of previous 
reforms. This law discouraged precarious forms of land access and it also reinforced 
property rights (Cabrera, 2008). Nevertheless, it failed in the redistribution of land 
ownership among the underprivileged. Once again, these kinds of reforms benefited to 
minorities. Besides, in the same year, the General Law of Financial Institutions liberalized 
banking business. It is important to highlight this fact since it represented the main cause of 
the 1999 crisis. 
In 1998, a new constitution promoted the recognition of collective rights of indigenous 
people. Therefore, indigenous people through the formation of the 'Confederation of 
Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE)' obtained wide recognition in the country, 
so they started to participate in the politics (Sánchez J. , 2007) 
In 1999, during the presidency of Jamil Mahuad (1998-2000) Ecuador experienced the 
greatest financial crisis in its history. It was caused by the enactment of the General Law of 
Financial System in 1994, which eliminated control and supervision on financial 
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institutions, emphasizing self-regulation. But these actions only caused deregulation (BCE, 
2008). In general, the causes of the financial crisis were lack of control to bankers, 
liberalization of capital flows, and devaluation of national currency (Mayoral, 2009). Also, 
some of its triggers were financial irresponsibility, lawlessness and corruption. 
As a logical consequence of the imposition of ‘neoliberalism’ and the crisis; a new belief 
arose in the country and was called 'economic terrorism'. According to (Acosta & Schuldt, 
2000), this term refers to the action of any person, institution or media to disseminate 
information lacking empirical verification. Such actions leads people to make decisions that 
transform a rumor into truth, based on speculation. 
Within this context, the worst consequences of the crisis were directed to social issues, such 
as the rapid impoverishment of the population and the high concentration of wealth. The 
Table. No.5 indicates that in 1990 the poorest 20% received 4.6% of revenue, whilst in 
2000 the same segment of the population received less than 2.5%. By contrast, the richest 
20% increased its revenue collection from 52% to 58%.  
Table No. 5                                                                                                                                                                    
Share of Total Income (%), 1990-2000 
Year The poorest 20% The richest 20% 
1990 4,60% 52,00% 
1995 4,10% 54,90% 
1999 2,46% 61,20% 
2000 2,10% 58,00% 
Source: Central Bank of Ecuador, Monthly statistical information. 
 
In early 2000, the 'dollarization' was imposed in Ecuador as a solution to the crisis. This 
process was sustained by several sources, such as remittances and high international oil 
prices. Consequently, the post-dollarization period (2000-2006) was determined by political 
instability reflected in frequent changes of government. The institutional structure was 
negatively affected because of the lack of State commitment to overcome the crisis. The 
bad outcomes emerged briefly, so uncertainty and social divergence rose to critical levels. 
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The Graph No. 10 indicates that despite political difficulties, Ecuador started to grow at real 
rates above 4% (except in 2003), a high percentage compared to Latin America average. It 
was part of the recovery process, nevertheless, economic growth was considered weak and 
erratic. Moreover, in 2005 Ecuador achieved price stabilization but it was not enough to 
recover its economic stability.        
Graph. No. 10                                                                                                                                       
Growth Rate*, 2000-2006  
           Source: ECLAC, Economic Indicators and Statistics.                                                                                                                                                        
* Total Annual GDP at constant prices 
Regarding inequality, the Gini index fell about 3.5 percentage points; that is from 60.1 in 
1999 to 56.6 in 2000, as a result of the recovery phase after the 1999 crisis. But after 2000, 
the drops in inequality had not been substantial. Thus, Graph No. 11 shows a slight 
improvement over the period, that is a modest reduction of 3.4 percentage points but in 6 
years. 
Similarly, the income gap has experienced a slight reduction, so the differences between 
rich and poor remain large. For instance, in 2000, the poorest 20% of the population 
received 3% of income, while the richest 20% of the population received 60.8%; whereas, 
in 2006, the poorest 20% of the population received 3.6% of income, while the richest 20% 
of the population received 57.7%. The Graph No. 12 presents the changes in inequality as 
measured by the distribution of income among population quintiles. 
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Graph. No. 11                                                                                                                                       
GINI Index, 1999-2006 
Source: World Bank, Development Indicators                                                                                                                                                       
*Measure of income inequality within a country. In this sense, 0 implies perfect equality whereas 100 represent perfect inequality. 
Graph. No. 12                                                                                                                                       
Inequality trend, 1999-2006 
             Source: World Bank, Poverty & Equity. 
Moreover (Sánchez, 2005) affirmed that this gradual recovery was the result of the 
establishment of the new economic system. Also, the labor sector experienced significant 
increases in employment. The Graph. No. 13 shows a modest recovery in the sector 
because the unemployment and underemployment decreased. Despite the downward trend 
in 2003, the underemployment reported 45.8% that accounted for almost half of the 
economically active population.  
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Graph. No. 13                                                                                                                                       
Underemployment and Unemployment, 2000-2004                                                  
Percentages (%) 
Source: Central Bank of Ecuador, Monthly statistical information  
Further, since 2000, inflation converged towards international levels, but this process was 
slow and costly. In this respect, Ecuadorian Government obtained the expected results since 
the inflation decreased from 96.1% in 2000 to 12.5% in 2002 and finally to 3.3 % in 2006 
(Acosta & Falconí, 2005). The next graph shows the downward trend of inflation. 
Graph. No. 14                                                                                                                                      
Inflation: Rate of Change of Consumer Price Index, 2000-2006                             
Percentages (%) 
                        Source: Acosta, 2012 
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Until 2003, the trade balance remained in deficit due to heavy reliance on imports of capital 
goods. But, since 2004, oil exports increased and Ecuadorian income rose due to high 
international oil prices. The Graph. No. 15 shows that the trade balance turned positive 
since 2004, but it rose slightly due to lack of competitiveness. 
Graph. No. 15                                                                                                                                      
Trade Balance, 2001-2006                                                                                                                    
Millions of dollars
Source: Central Bank of Ecuador, Monthly Statistical Information. 
 
In terms of tax revenues, the figures increased significantly owing to improved tax 
collection. But tax evasion remained high because a widespread custom called ‘native 
cunning’. This term refers to the lack of respect for rules and regulations, and also 
indifference to the common good in a context of individual interest. 
Despite the inequity of government expenditure
15
, poverty gradually declined due to 
remittances sent by migrants. In this regard, remittances were an important resource for 
Ecuadorian economy. The Graph No. 16 presents an increasing trend, so the remittances/ 
GDP increased from 8.2% in 2000 up to 13.3% in 2006. (BCE, 2005).  
 
                                                            
15 Most of government spending was directed to pay external debt that decreased from 97% of GDP in 2000 
to 32% in 2006. 
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Graph. No. 16                                                                                                                                     
Remittances as % of GDP, 2000-2006                                                               
Source: INEC, 2006. 
Despite the recovery process, there were no substantial changes owing to 'dollarization'. 
The State was too weak to solve the crisis due to political instability. The most benefited 
sectors were powerful groups who had knowledge of ‘dollarization’ before its 
establishment. They profited enormously by acquiring obligations in national currency 
since they changed the money to dollars days before the event. Thus, political instability, 
corruption and impunity remained in the country during those years (Dávalos, 2004). 
 A Closer Look to the Core Concepts 
The second period began with a new window of opportunity that emerged as a result of the 
return to democracy. Although, this return did not emerged for the right reasons, still it was 
considered a big chance. This 'window of opportunity' changed the power structure and also 
contributed to the rise of a new belief in participatory democracy, because citizens did not 
know that military power was still controlling the power. The business elites and military 
groups took advantage of this window of opportunity, since they chose democracy as the 
only way to preserve their power. It brought new institutions and policies in the country 
based on neoliberalism. 
The return of democracy was shaped by the implementation of 1979 Constitution under the 
leadership of Jaime Roldós. It promoted civil liberties, for instance it eliminated the literacy 
as a requirement to vote.  Thus, indigenous participation increased in democratic processes. 
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It could have been a significant shift towards legitimate democracy, but the subsequent 
governments did not support the promotion of social rights. Rather, Hurtado used policies 
that favored to private sector and then Febres Cordero modified those policies to benefit the 
business sector (Guzmán, 1996).  
Besides, Ecuador did not meet the requirement of social homogeneity, which was necessary 
for the establishment of legitimate democracy. Indigenous organizations were deeply 
divided by regional, economic, and social problems. And, there were no inclusive 
organizations because of the lack of policy objectives in favor of society. 
The racism was institutionalized in Ecuador because the roles of the mestizos could not be 
performed by indigenous or black people, in spite of their rights established in the new 
Constitution of 1998, another formal institution which failed to enhance the living 
conditions of citizens. The belief of participatory democracy was weakened over time since 
the citizens suffered the consequences of political instability, international crises and 
economic imbalance. These facts contributed to the elimination of the belief. 
Concerning, the structural reforms based on the ‘Washington Consensus’ model, these did 
not generate the expected results. As Alston noted in one of his conferences, the 
transplantation of successful models is not the solution for the national problems. These 
models do not work because the changes must be generated within countries (Ayala S. , 
2014). 
At the end of the 90s a new belief arose as a consequence of the financial crisis, this was 
the belief in economic terrorism. Consequently, people lived in an environment of 
uncertainty and fear. Also, the corruption became a widespread custom for Ecuadorian 
society, thus citizens lost confidence in the political system and society in general. 
Accordingly, a new window of opportunity emerged as a direct result of the 1999 crisis. 
This was the right time to take advantage of the situation and thus solve the problems in the 
country.  But the unstable governments wasted this window of opportunity, perhaps for fear 
of failure or the desire for power and personal enrichment. Again, they did not consider 
fundamental values and principles of society. In addition, the 'native cunning' as 
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widespread custom was adopted by political elites to enlarge their personal wealth; they 
knew that the corruption cases were not sanctioned by the law.  
This period was characterized by corrupt governments; therefore citizens exercised their 
power to overthrow them. Thus, the old belief in economic terrorism was associated with a 
new belief, which was the belief in popular power. In this context, people realized that no 
one should abuse of the democratic power granted by the citizens. 
The extractive economy, the survival of certain segregationist social hierarchies, the state's 
inability to enforce the rule of law and the emergence of various forms of populism, 
restricted the possibilities to achieve progress in Ecuador. 
Lastly, the bad outcomes were part of bad customs, such as native cunning, dishonesty, 
corruption, tax evasion and mistrust. Besides, chronic political instability with unequal 
opportunities hampered Ecuadorian development. Again, the governments failed in the 
attempt to overcome the national problems, apparently an endless story.   
5.3. Rafael Correa Seizes the Window of Opportunity, 2007-2014  
After several years of institutional instability and bad governments, a new leader appears on 
the political scene. Thus, Rafael Correa seized a window of opportunity in order to embark 
the country into a new path towards a more open economic and political society.  
As (Alston et al., 2013) noted, the window of opportunity emerges when the economic and 
political outcomes differ greatly from those expected by the people who make the rules. In 
this respect, in the post-dollarization period (2000-2006), Ecuador went through a recover 
phase after the 1999 crisis. The economic results showed a slight improvement in the 
country. However, the political outcomes were disastrous, democracy was weakened by 
constant abuse of power and leadership was absent. Thus, the fatality of political results 
provoked a crisis of political representation. The big institutional failures showed that 
representation of masses was almost impossible.  
The neoliberal model did not bring the expected results. As an illustration: high levels of 
inequality and poverty, greater concentration of wealth in minorities and rapid deterioration 
of labor and living conditions (Correa, 2014). 
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The crisis of representation was a window of opportunity. This crisis showed the inevitable 
consequences of bad decisions, lack of leadership, international crisis, national crisis and 
political instability of the second period (1980-2006). So, Correa took advantage of this 
opportunity, and he used his leadership power to change the trajectory of the country and 
break the Ecuadorian neoliberal past through the implementation of some institutional 
changes. 
According to the conceptual framework, Correa was the person who made the difference. 
He exploited his leadership skills and academic knowledge at the right time, i.e. when the 
window of opportunity appeared. The window of opportunity changed the configuration of 
power and it also led to a transformation of customs and beliefs that are essential to build 
strong institutional bases. It is important to consider that beliefs become malleable during a 
window of opportunity (Alston et al., 2013). The transition to new beliefs and institutions 
promotes social welfare and hence national development. 
 The Emergence of the Window of Opportunity in 2006 
Rafael Correa entered the political scene as Minister of Finance under the government of 
Alfredo Palacio in 2005. He obtained political recognition due to its strong nationalist and 
anti-neoliberal ideology  (Mantilla & Mejía, 2012).. 
As noted before, the hard and complex historical process experienced by Ecuador explains 
the beginning of a new period since 2007. So, taking into account the interaction of the key 
concepts, this period includes the strong presence of a leader (Rafael Correa) who took 
advantage of the window of opportunity (crisis of political representation), also he molded 
customs and beliefs and he took appropriate decisions in order to locate Ecuador into a new 
trajectory through the implementation of institutional changes that will lead to sustainable 
development in the future. 
It does not mean that Ecuador has overcome underdevelopment, but rather that this country 
is on the right path towards development through deepening of new institutions and the 
recent belief in inclusive social transformation, which will be explained later. 
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So, what means crisis of representation? it was the absence or weakness of presidential 
leadership since 1996, plus the weakening of political parties and the 'leaders' of the 
traditional political class. Essentially, the crisis originated in the unresponsiveness of 
presidents and political parties to handle the new circumstances and needs of Ecuadorian 
society. This fact was represented in the second period during the years (1996-2006) 
through continuous changes and presidential overthrows (Paz y Miño, 2012). Indeed, 
during 1996-2006, Ecuador had seven governments. There were a short dictatorship and 
three democratically elected presidents, but they were overthrown by large citizen 
mobilizations, considering the dominant belief in popular power, since individuals wanted 
to stop the corruptions and the constant abuses. 
Consequently, a new election was called in 2006, in which Rafael Correa participated as 
strange because he did not belong to traditional political elites. Nevertheless, he won the 
presidential election with great public support. Thereby, in order to fulfill his election 
commitment of country’s radical transformation, Correa and his work team established a 
new constitutional process through three important phases, 1) a referendum to authorize or 
deny the call for a Constituent Assembly, 2) the development of a new Constitution and 3) 
an amendment to the Constitution  (Mantilla & Mejía, 2012).. 
So, the referendum concerning the Constituent Assembly was intended to reform the State 
towards decentralization and improve weak institutions of the democratic system. Its main 
objective was to transform the regulatory and institutional framework in the country. 
Furthermore, the second phase regarding the elaboration of the new Constitution was 
crucial to shape the new belief in inclusive social transformation, which is part of the 
institutional change in Ecuador. Also, during the process of strengthening this institution 
(Constitution 2008), another phase appeared in 2011 that refers to a referendum and 
popular consultation. This phase will be detailed later. 
In this context, these phases help to better comprehend the presidential 
decisions/incentives, institutional changes, sustained leadership, transition of new customs 
and beliefs and lastly the current outcomes in contrast to the first and second period. This 
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information will be useful to understand the break with its past through the application of 
new post-neoliberal model. 
Besides, these phases legitimize and strengthen democracy. This process began in the 
second period in 1979. But, democracy was established for the wrong reasons, mainly to 
protect the interests of elites and military groups. In this way, ‘democracy’ began to have a 
real sense, thus the State started to build the foundation for democracy 'by and for' the 
people. 
 
 The New Constitution (2008) and the Emergence of a New Belief 
In the second period, the 1998 Constitution was designed under a neoliberal scheme. It was 
recognized for its advances in dogmatic matters but criticized for its organic development 
and institutional design. The formal institutions were weakened over time, and beliefs and 
customs were focused on anti-progress. A year later in 1999, the belief in economic 
terrorism gripped the country; this was a chaotic moment in Ecuadorian history.  
The ideologues of the 1998 Constitution mistakenly thought that the strengthening of 
presidentialism would solve the problem of governance and thus the crisis of 
representation. Nevertheless, they did not consider the central problem: lack of leadership 
and political bad decisions that drove to inevitable crises in relation to banks and 
institutions (Mantilla & Mejía, 2012). 
After that Correa seized the window of opportunity in 2006, he assumed the challenge of 
transforming a weak state. To achieve this goal, he formed alliances and coalitions in his 
favor. Consequently, the constitutional process was the result of the decisions of the 
president and his working team. In this context, the most essential programmatic change 
between the three phases was the Constitution of 2008 that established rules and regulations 
for society's welfare. Thus, many achievements in relation to formal institutions were 
generated. But much remains to be done in reference to informal institutions, collective 
action and cultural change. 
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As (Alston et al, 2013) noted, the most important belief belongs to the leader, in this case 
Rafael Correa started the belief in inclusive social transformation in early 2007 through his 
election promises. At the beginning of the period, this belief was not shared, only the 
president has this belief based on his future expectations.  
Because electoral promises became reality, the belief in inclusive social transformation was 
spread throughout Ecuadorian society, which largely supported the president. It does not 
mean that there is no opposition or interest groups. Rather the president's belief was shared 
and strengthened by the citizens, who recognized that economic and social results matched 
the initial expectations. That was a major step in the new Ecuadorian trajectory. 
Turning to the significance of the Constitution, its implementation was possible by the 
legislative activity that took place in the National Constituent Assembly in 2007. The 
Graph No.17 shows the percentage of statutory bodies approved by the judiciary. Most of 
them have been instrumental in the development of political model. In fact over 70% of the 
approved laws have had the function of guaranteeing the rights, structuring the government 
system and promoting development regime (Falconí & Muñoz, 2012). 
Graph No. 17                                                                                                                                   
103 Mandates and Laws Approved since 2007  
                     
Source: Falconí & Muñoz, 2012 
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Regarding, the third phase, the referendum of 2011 was centered on the transformation of 
justice. Its main objectives were to confront the monopolies and strengthen national 
security. It included a popular consultation, in which citizens positively answered the 
questions of national scope. Thus the individuals strengthened and supported the dominant 
belief in inclusive social transformation. It is important to note that the popular acceptance 
of Correa was supported for major changes and good results obtained as part of the 
constitutional process. 
Indeed, the constitutional process restructures extant institutions in order to sustain the 
horizontal exercise of power. This implies the citizenization of the State mainly from 
community spaces such as collective forms of social organization. Therefore, democracy 
entered into a process of institutional strengthening and deepening. Further, as a result of 
the Constitutional process, labor rights, political security and social spending were 
strengthened, marking the start of the new path of institutional change in Ecuador (Mantilla 
& Mejía, 2012).  
The Constitution for ‘Good Living’: this Constitution builds the institutional foundation 
for 'Good Living' that represents an alternative to conventional development in the case of 
Latin American countries (Acosta, 2012). In this regard, the 'Good Living' has been applied 
in the elaboration of planning programs, which tries to apply a set of policies and 
instruments to alleviate the condition of 'underdevelopment' (SENPLADES , 2010). 
International organizations recognize the country's achievements in social, politic and 
economic terms. For instance, ECLAC highlighted achievements by the Ecuadorian 
government in reference to the reduction of inequality and poverty rates through a dynamic 
economic policy from the lower strata. Thus, the economy must achieve equality to grow, 
so governments should not focus only on growth (El Telégrafo, 2012). The next section 
will analyze social and economic transformations that support a democratic growth with 
greater justice. 
 
 
 51 
 
 The Economic and Social Transformation 
Correa and his working team replaced the enterprise model based on neoliberal ideology, 
with a new post-neoliberal model focused on a process of endogenous development. In this 
way, the Ecuadorian State regained its involvement in the economy while business groups 
and elites ceased to be the hegemonic sectors (Falconí & Muñoz, 2012). 
Ecuador's economic progress is widely recognized through economic statistics and annual 
reports of international organizations, such as ECLAC and the UNDP. The economic and 
social results described below confirm the start of a new path towards a more open society. 
Within this context, the economy cannot be assessed only by the value of final goods and 
services produced in the country. In this case, the Ecuadorian government has considered 
strengthening distributional equality and equity as major factors for achieving ‘Good 
living,’ denoted in the 2008 Constitution. 
The change of economic policies has promoted the concept of economic, social and 
solidary system, breaking with the neoliberal paradigm of the past that identified growth 
with development, and capital over labor. The results of economic policy are measured not 
only in terms of production and growth; rather it is mainly about employment generation, 
poverty alleviation and the decrease of inequalities (Sánchez, 2012). 
Ecuador has grown steadily except in 2009 due to the effects of international crisis, but 
despite national vulnerability to external shocks, the country recovered from the drop and 
continued with a growing trend. The Graph No.18 shows that in 2009, Ecuador fell at 
0.6%, nevertheless this country did not have a negative percentage compared to Latin 
America. In 2011 Ecuador reached its highest economic growth around 8%, this is a third 
place at the regional level after Panama (10.9%) and Argentina (8.9%) (ECLAC, 2011). 
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Graph. No. 18                                                                                                                                   
GDP Growth Rate (%), 2007-2013 
Source: ECLAC, Economic Indicators and Statistics.    
 
As a crucial part of this economic growth, the government changed its priorities towards 
public investment. So, the state invested a higher percentage in the social sector, and less on 
service of external debt. Thereby, in 2011, 7% of the National Budget was used to pay 
external debt while in 2006 was 32%. In this context, Ecuador achieved one of the most 
successful debt renegotiations in Latin America (Pozo, 2012). 
During the post-dollarization period, social spending as a percentage of GDP was about 
4.5%, but since 2007 this percentage doubles and reaches 9.62%. The next graph shows 
that social spending, especially in education, health and social welfare has increased 
dramatically. 
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Graph. No. 19                                                                                                                  
Social Spending, 2007-2011                                                                                        
Source: Mayoral, 2012. 
 
Concerning the topic of equity and abilities, institutional changes have promoted the 
reduction of unemployment, poverty and inequality. And it also increased coverage of 
social services (Mayoral, 2012). In more detail, in terms of unemployment, the Graph 
No.20 indicates that in 2013 Ecuador had the lowest rate of unemployment over the period 
(4.6%). Thus, unemployment has experienced a downward trend compared to Latin 
American average. However, the percentages for the years 2009 and 2010 correspond to the 
effects of international crisis, for that reason those percentages are higher. 
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Graph. No. 20                                                                                                                  
Unemployment Rate, 2007-2013                                                            
 Source: ECLAC, Economic Indicators and Statistics.  
Furthermore, in 2001-2006, the percentage of coverage of the basic food basket by the 
average family income did not reach 70%, in contrast in 2011; the current government 
covered 85% of that basket. This fact is important since it creates solutions for one of the 
most crucial needs in developing countries: a living wage (Falconí & Muñoz, 2012). 
Besides, the reduction of poverty and inequality is one of the greatest achievements by the 
2008 Constitution and State Planning. Accordingly, the Graphs Nos. 21 and 22, show their 
downward trend. Thus, the improvement of equity, equality and redistributive justice is 
undeniable.  
Graph. No. 21                                                                                                                  
Poverty Head Count Ratio at national Poverty Line*, 2007-2012                                               
(% of population)     
                           
Source: World Bank, Poverty & Equity.                                                                                                                                                                 
*This graph shows the evolution of poverty in national poverty lines of Ecuadorian case. 
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Graph. No. 22                                                                                                                  
GINI Index, 2007-2011
 Source: World Bank, Poverty & Equity 
In the process of spread and strengthened the belief in inclusive social transformation, the 
president and his work team through their choices on economic policy have achieved 
significant progress in the country. As an example, by means of conditional transfers, 
Ecuadorian government has covered to almost all persons in need. The overcoverage and 
undercoverage have been eliminated almost entirely. 
Although Ecuador has achieved significant progress in the new path sustained by 
institutional changes, it is also true that there are still great challenges to deter deviation 
from the trajectory towards an open society. For instance, the inter-institutional action is 
still insufficient and some Ecuadorian customs have not been modified in accordance with 
the dominant belief in inclusive social transformation.  
 Spread of the Dominant Belief through a New Fiscal Policy 
The belief in inclusive social transformation was propagated from the president to society 
due to the strong results obtained from the constitutional process. Moreover, the social and 
economic transformation was the result of the change in economic policy in favor of an 
equitable society; so it provoked changes in the social behavior of Ecuadorians. The 
outcomes were consistent with national expectations. After a long time, the governmental 
leadership was able to eradicate most of the abuse of power and corruption of the elites.  
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In order to sustain and strengthen the belief in inclusive social transformation, fiscal policy 
plays a necessary and crucial role. In this respect, the 2008 Constitution raises an equitable 
and redistributive economy. So, the government has focused on improving the tax system, 
apart from the changes in economic policy. The creation of a tax system that redistributes 
wealth is an essential element in democracy to break with the historical trend (Viteri, 2012). 
Tax evasion was one of the common customs of the citizens in the second period since they 
knew the law weakness. But, this custom was modified. Since 2007, due to institutional 
changes and strengthening the law, most people complied with their tax obligations to 
avoid penalties and contribute to progress. So the change of custom was generated by the 
belief in inclusive social transformation.  
In short, fiscal policy plays an important role in achieving the functions that the 
Constitution granted the State, because it has the ability to change the incentives of citizens. 
Thus, the State has shown that it properly handled these issues with direct regulation 
through law enforcement and several economic instruments. 
 A Closer Look to the Core Concepts 
The second period was characterized by two crucial beliefs; the first belief arose from the 
1999 crisis, in which Ecuadorians suffered the negative consequences of political, social 
and economic instability. Belief in economic terrorism forced people to make tough 
decisions in search of better living conditions. For this reason, many Ecuadorians migrated 
to several countries, including Spain and the U.S. 
People lost confidence in the government and the entire political system. The belief in 
economic terrorism weakened but not disappeared in this sense dollarization sustained the 
presence of this belief. Although economic indicators showed a modest improvement; 
political instability led to a situation of continuous anxiety in the country. 
Democracy played a minimal role, since people chose their leaders but they did not respond 
to national interests. Moreover, elites sought to strengthen its power at the expense of 
country’s stability. Consequently, due to popular discontent with political outcomes, the 
belief in people power emerged as a solution to stop the corruption and abuse of power. In 
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the post-dollarization period; the people overthrew three governments in a row, thus it 
started a crisis of political representation in the country. 
The crisis of political representation reflected a new window of opportunity that emerged in 
the new electoral process in 2006. Correa took advantage of this window of opportunity 
and won the election with a large percentage above his competitor Alvaro Noboa, who 
represented the country's wealthiest sectors. People opted for a new figure which proposed 
a total transformation of the country. 
As described above, the beliefs during the window of opportunity are malleable but the 
beliefs must go through a long process of adaptation, strengthening and deepening. Thus, in 
2007 Correa began a new belief in inclusive social transformation based on his expectations 
as leader of the country. Nevertheless, in the beginning of this period this belief was not 
shared by society since this process requires citizen’s support and also takes time.  
This period recovered the belief in participatory democracy, in which Correa's leadership 
was instrumental to the establishment of democracy 'by and for' the people, since the State 
recovered the lost role in the neoliberal years. So he and his working team promoted the 
creation of a constitutional process in three phases, 1) the referendum for the establishment 
of the Constituent Assembly, 2) The 2008 Constitution; and 3) the amendment of the 
Constitution. Its main objective was the construction of a more fair and equitable society. 
Accordingly, in order to build the basis for distributive equity and equality the Government 
decided to change most of the economic and fiscal policy. The economic and social 
transformations show that the results were consistent with initial expectations. Therefore 
belief in inclusive social transformation was expanded to most of society and people started 
to support the government system and to the President. 
The popular acceptance of President has grown dramatically. In this regard in 2013, Correa 
was re-elected for a new government term. Certainly the reasons for his re-election were 
based on his strong leadership, institutional changes, weakness of the opposition, 
discrediting of national elites and economic and political stability (Mejía, 2012). 
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The new path taken by Ecuador includes several institutional changes arising from the 
Ecuadorian constitutional process. Furthermore, the dominant belief of inclusive social 
transformation has played an important role to strengthen democracy and the 
institutionalism in the country. Thus, it is the beginning of a new era focused on a strong 
dominant belief. Despite the major transformation and institutional changes there are still 
many things to be done at least in reference to informal institutions. 
The dominant belief in inclusive social transformation has replaced the belief in economic 
terrorism, but the 'belief in popular power' was associated with the dominant belief. In this 
sense the majority of the population support to Correa's leadership because these people 
trust that these changes are not transitory. They hope that this new path will be continuous. 
However it should be noted that it takes a long period of time (not just 7 years) to confirm 
that these changes are not accidental interaction of key concepts. But it is possible that 
these changes represent the beginning of sustainable development for Ecuador. 
Finally, in the appendix, the Table No.6 shows a summary of the three periods with their 
respective beliefs, institutions and outcomes. 
6. Conclusions 
Since mid-1950, when the 'development' emerged strongly as the goal for developing 
countries, Ecuador has tried to achieve this path in different ways. For this purpose, 
governments have imposed certain strategies including several development models, 
planning programs, policies, etc. 
The path towards an open society has struggled due to high international dependence 
particular with the U.S., high levels of external debt, decline of agricultural booms, drop in 
oil prices, natural disasters, etc.  Besides, certain beliefs and customs have hindered 
Ecuadorian progress, for instance: corruption, abuse of power, native cunning, and the 
beliefs in permanent social status and economic terrorism. 
In this sense, Ecuador broke away from its past, since this country changed its trajectory 
towards a more equal and inclusive society.  
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According to (Alston et al., 2013) leadership is essential to understand how certain 
individuals at certain times in the history of a country make difference through their 
actions. This is just what happened in Ecuador when Rafael Correa seized the window of 
opportunity in 2006 that was the 'crisis of political representation' in order to shape social 
beliefs and create a deep structure for good outcomes. Thus, since 2007, Correa and his 
working team through the creation of a solid constitutional process have changed the 
trajectory of the country for better. So, it is important to stress that leadership was 
instrumental and necessary in this process. 
In this period (2007-2014) things have changed positively in Ecuador, which is confirmed 
by the economic and social outcomes. Economic growth and social spending had an 
upward trend, while poverty rates and inequality have declined significantly. Thus these 
results support the existence of a more open society. Furthermore, unemployment has 
declined steadily, which fosters one of the goals of state planning: the living wage. 
Regarding the hypothesis: the constitutional process has been quite robust, mainly the 
second phase: 2008 Constitution that has shaped institutional changes in the country. The 
Constitution through planning of 'Good Living', economic policy, fiscal policy and a 
myriad of laws and regulations has produced not only good economic and political 
outcomes, but rather greater social stability. Accordingly, the society has entered into a 
process of distributive equity and equality. In fact, this institutional change has generated 
the expected results according the expectations of the president and citizens.  
The Constitutional process was not an improvised rule, the study of their impact on 
institutional changes and economic and political performance has shown that Ecuador is in 
a new process towards a better society. These changes have been recognized by 
international institutions such as ECLAC and UNDP in its annual reports. 
In this respect, given the facts and circumstances; one can reasonable infer that Ecuador is a 
different country compared with its past. Thereby, this thesis provided strong connection 
between the circumstantial evidence and the hypothesis that is reflected in the constitutional 
process and its major changes regarding the increase in growth rate and social spending, 
and the decrease in unemployment, poverty and inequality. Moreover, the adoption of new 
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beliefs in society (in accordance with social welfare and national progress) promoted living 
conditions in the country.  
According to the framework developed by (Alston et al., 2013) the strong circumstantial 
evidence provides relevance to the case study. Also, Alston said that the hypothesis should 
not be rejected when there is a strong link between the evidence and the hypothesis. 
Consequently, due to the nature of analytic narratives, the study of the Ecuadorian case 
found strong support for the start of a new trajectory since 2007. In this case the hypothesis 
should not be rejected since the constitutional process was the trigger of institutional 
change towards a more open society. 
The analysis of interaction of the concepts has been fundamental to this Master thesis, 
regarding the explanation of the emergence of a new society. Thus: the leader (Rafael 
Correa) through the window of opportunity (crisis of political representation) has changed 
Ecuadorian society for better. His initial belief in inclusive social transformation was 
spread in society by institutional changes (constitutional process) and good economic and 
political outcomes. As a consequence, the belief in popular power has changed, i.e. this 
belief no longer overthrows governments, instead this belief supports governmental 
decisions. For this reason, Correa was re-elected for a new term, which shows that the facts 
are not acts of pure chance. 
The new expectations of citizens in this second term of the government exceed the current 
results. In other words, people have regained confidence in the executive and they expect 
new and better changes. Its expectations have grown in order to strengthen the belief in 
inclusive social transformation. This is a difficult challenge, but if Correa and his working 
team maintain their incentives aligned with the dominant belief, it is more likely that in the 
future, citizens' expectations will again coincide with the outcomes. 
Unlike the described-above facts, this research has a clear prediction based on the amount 
of circumstantial evidence. That is, that in the future Ecuador will strengthen its process of 
institutional change and also it will deepen the belief in inclusive social transformation, as 
long as there is a strong presence of a leader that supports the changes made during this 
period. Unfortunately, the analysis time of separation from the past (2007-2014), is too 
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short to state with certainty that Ecuador will not return to instability in economic or 
political terms. 
Similarly to (Alston et al., 2013) this study has no inclination towards certain president or 
political party. The findings were just a result of the strong link between the evidence and 
the hypothesis.  
Finally, it is true that Ecuador has initiated a process of social and economic 
transformation, but the process of 'changing customs' is a fundamental challenge to 
undertake. It is impossible to deny that there is currently a lag between changes in formal 
institutions and the immobility of informal institutions. Because even though some customs 
have been eradicated , other customs still respond to the pattern established in the 
neoliberal model, such as : social polarization, individualism and loss of values. Therefore, 
to achieve the prediction described above, it would be necessary to reduce the gap between 
formal and informal institutions. 
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8. Appendix 
Table No. 6                                                                                                                            
Ecuadorian Development since 1950* 
* This table was made through the results obtained in Analytical Narratives. It is important to said that the design of it was based on the 
conceptual framework developed by (Alston et al., 2013) 
PERIOD 1950-1979 1980-2006 2007-2014
BELIEF Personal and National Development
Economic Terrorism / Popular 
power
Inclusive Social Transformation
Economic: limited economic 
prosperity, public planning through 
the Planning Board. It also includes 
Import Substitution and 
Industrialization. Agrarian Reform 
that eliminated 'huasipungo' 
(institution of precarious work)
Economic: neoliberal policies, 
deregulation of the financial 
system; enterprise development 
model, Agrarian Development 
Law.
Economic: public planning with 
the new ideology of 'Good 
Living', new economic and fiscal 
policy. 
Political: Constitution of 1979 that 
comprises the institutionalization of 
political parties and promotion of 
national rights
Political: return of democracy 
(meta-institutions), 1998 
Constitution under neoliberal 
ideology
Political: Constitutional process: 
Constituent Assembly, 2008 
Constitution, the constitutional 
amendment of 2011.
Economic: limited growth, more 
'extractivism', high dependence on 
external relations, economic 
instability.
Economic: financial crisis, high 
inflation, economic slowdown.
Economic: growth with equity, 
reduction of poverty and 
inequality and drop of 
unemployent. Also, an increase 
of social spending.
Political: the largest period of 
dictatorships, political instability 
and weak democracy
Political: price stabilization, weak 
democracy,  huge political 
instability due to crisis of 
representation.
Political: social inclusion through 
the implementation of good 
policies. Strong presence and 
leadership of certain political 
parties.
INSTITUTIONS
OUTCOMES
